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Abstract 
   In this paper, a variety-expanding growth model has been constructed in the classical 
North-South framework. Optimal degree of IPR protection has been explicitly computed both for 
the North and the South in the sense of welfare maximizing, in the short run and non-short run of 
the economies. Endogenous innovation growth rate and the policy of innovation subsidy for the 
Southern government have been introduced into our model. The relationship between IPR 
protection and long-term growth rate has also been thoroughly investigated. Finally, the issue 
about international policy cooperation has been explored and we show that it is possible that an 
optimal degree of Southern IPR protection would also be globally efficient in some comparatively 
weak conditions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Our major goal of this paper is to investigate the existence of an optimal degree of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection for the developing country in the classical 
North-South framework. In our general equilibrium model, the South invents new 
intermediates as well as the North, and the imitation, which only exists in the South, 
will be divided into two types 2 : the efficient imitation, that is imitating the 
intermediates invented in the North to improve the final output of the South, and the 
inefficient imitation, i.e., imitating other domestic innovators. It is easy to notice that a 
strengthening of IPR protection will exhibit both positive and negative effects on the 
South, given an equal (e.g., without discrimination) treatment to the above two kinds 
of imitations. Then, naturally, the problem facing us is that whether there is an optimal 
degree of IPR protection for the South after comprehensively balancing between these 
fundamentally opposing objects. 
Rather, another policy instrument, subsidy to innovation, for the South has been 
introduced into our model, which will actually relax the tension3 facing the Southern 
government. And the optimal degree of IPR protection in the sense of welfare 
maximizing has also been computed and studied, both in the short run and non-short 
run of the economies. Moreover, we have comparatively and thoroughly explored the 
case of exogenous innovation and that of endogenous innovation4. Finally, the issue of 
international policy cooperation has been explored, and we, as a matter of fact, prove 
that there are possibilities such that the corresponding optimal degree of Southern IPR 
protection is also globally efficient in some conditions. 
   Generally speaking, some literatures insist that any IPR protection in the South 
                                                        
2 In Chu et al (2011)’s Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier, imitation activities also consist of two 
types, efficient imitation and inefficient imitation, and they call it efficient imitation because it raises the level of 
technology in the industry and call it inefficient imitation because it contributes nothing to the industry’s level of 
technology. Noting that our model is the classical expanding-variety growth model, our definition of the two kinds 
of imitation activities is a little different from Chu et al (2011)’s, and one can refer to section 2.10. of our following 
model for more details. 
3 The purpose of the Southern government is, on the one hand, encouraging domestic innovation while, on the 
other hand, promoting economic growth with domestic welfare improved, which indeed benefits from efficient 
imitation. Noting that, the Southern government, after subsidy policy being incorporated into our model, can 
employ effective policy combination, which would thus enhance the policy flexibility, and hence the tension is, to 
some extent, relaxed. And one can refer to section 2.15. of the following model for details. 
4 Specifically, we realize endogenous innovation by means of “endogenous innovation growth rate”, which would 
be regarded as a reasonable approach. 
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will hurt the South; while, alternatively, other papers argued that there is an optimal 
level of IPR protection for the South. To the former, for example, Chin and Grossman 
(1990) conducted their partial equilibrium analysis in a North-South trading 
environment with exclusion of any possibility of innovation in the South, finding that 
the North always benefits from having the protection of intellectual property rights 
while the South benefits from the ability to pirate technology. Deardorff (1992) 
studied the welfare effects of global patent protection and suggested that the welfare 
of the inventing country certainly rises with the extension of patent protection while 
that of the other country probably falls. Schneider (2005)’s analysis suggests that IPRs 
have a stronger impact on domestic innovation for developed counties and might even 
negatively impact innovation in developing countries. And also, in his seminal paper, 
Helpman (1993) develops a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the 
North invents new products and the South imitates them, proving that the South will 
lose from tighter intellectual property rights in the short run of the economies. 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, most of the subsequent literatures inspired 
by Helpman (1993) prove that there should exist an optimal degree of IPR protection 
in both quality-ladder models and expanding-variety models. 
For instance, after noting that R&D is easier in competitive sectors than it is in 
monopolistic sectors for both technical and legal reasons, Horri and Iwaisako (2007) 
argued that there is an optimal degree of IPR protection so that the long-term growth 
rate is maximized. In an expanding-variety type R&D-based endogenous growth 
model, Kwan and Lai (2003) show that there is a tradeoff between current loss in 
consumption and future gain in growth rate when IPR protection is strengthened 
across industries, thereby proving that there exists a finite optimal degree of IPR 
protection. 
   What’s more, Furukawa (2007) constructs a variety expansion model of 
endogenous growth in a closed economy, and shows that there is an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between innovation and IPR protection, thereby implying that 
IPR protection is not always the stronger the better. Chen and Puttitanun (2005) 
illustrate the trade-off between imitating foreign technologies and encouraging 
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domestic innovation in a developing country’s choice of IPRs and their empirical 
analysis confirms that there is a U-shaped relationship between IPRs and economic 
development. And inspired by the Chinese experience, Chu et al. (2011) develop a 
Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier and show that optimal IPR 
protection is stage-dependent, that is, at an early stage of development, the country 
implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation, while at a later stage of 
development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic 
innovation5. 
   In the present paper, it is shown that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between Northern welfare and the inverse measure of Southern IPR protection, which 
resembles to Helpman (1993)’s conclusion that tighter IPR protection also hurts the 
North whenever economies begin in steady state with certain small rates of imitation. 
Moreover, after incorporating endogenous innovation growth rate into our model, we 
prove that there is a U-shaped relationship between Northern equilibrium growth rate 
and Southern IPR protection. On the other hand, for the South, we show that, given 
the specification of lump-sum taxation, an increasing of the subsidy rate to innovation 
will definitely improve the welfare. We argue that there always exists an optimal 
degree of Southern IPR protection in our model and there are complementary 
relationships between those optimal IPR protection policies and the innovation 
subsidy policy. Finally, it is confirmed that there is a U-shaped relationship between 
equilibrium growth rate and the IPR protection, and the equilibrium growth rate of the 
economy does not depend on innovation subsidy, after innovation growth rate being 
endogenously concerned. 
   Furthermore, there are also some papers that study the issue of international policy 
cooperation, for example, Grossman and Lai (2004) studied the policy game between 
the North and South, proving that the harmonization of patent policies is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the efficiency of the global patent regime when two 
governments have an incentive to negotiate an international patent agreement. 
                                                        
5 Our discussion corresponds to a later stage of development. However, our results reveal that IPR protection is 
not always the stronger the better both for the South and the North. 
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However, our concerning of international policy cooperation, via noting that only 
Southern IPR protection is discussed, is a little different from that of Grossman and 
Lai (2004), and actually, we argue the existence of an optimal degree of Southern IPR 
protection, which is explicitly computed, and which is globally efficient. 
   What’s the main inspiration of the present paper? Firstly, a simple framework is 
supplied so that the optimal degree of IPR protection can be explicitly computed, 
which will completely supports very rich comparative static analyses. Secondly, some 
papers (Spencer and Brander, 1983; Glass, 1997; Muniagurria and Singh, 1997; 
Haaland and Kind, 2008) have studied the efficient employment of subsidy policy, 
nevertheless, few, if any, like the present paper thoroughly depicts the internal 
relationship between optimal IPR protection and the policy choice of innovation 
subsidy. We, accordingly, claim that a good understanding of the internal interaction 
mechanisms between different policies would greatly improve the efficiency of 
corresponding policy combinations in reality. It is especially worth emphasizing is 
that the case of endogenous innovation growth would lead to totally different 
conclusions relative to that of exogenous innovation growth. And hence we insist, as 
is shown in our model, that the above two cases should be comparatively and 
thoroughly studied, thereby offering insights into our recognition about institutional 
arrangements in reality. Moreover, the role of technology match has been discussed in 
determining the optimal IPR protection for the South in the North-South framework. 
And finally, the present paper is encouraged to supply a simple approach leading to a 
new6 understanding of international policy cooperation. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model and our 
key propositions, section 3 discusses the issue of international policy cooperation 
conditional on the model in section 2, section 4 concludes and the Appendix provides 
                                                        
6 It is new because it is based upon the specification that there is only one control variable, which belongs to the 
South and intrinsically affects the North, and which is also endogenously impacted or partly determined by 
parameters belong to the North. And thus the way of discussing international policy cooperation is different from 
that of existing literatures, e.g., Kehoe (1989), Maggi (1999), Devereux and Engel (2003), and Canzoneri et al 
(2005). And especially, Kehoe (1989) referred to the international cooperative regime in the sense of that policies 
are set sequentially by a single decision-making body to maximize world welfare. Certainly, in the current paper 
we don’t discuss such kind of cooperative game which intimately depends on the existence of a so-called world 
welfare function. Moreover, our discussion expands following two steps: firstly, the existence of optimal IPR 
protection both for the South and the North; and secondly, the possibilities of international policy cooperation. 
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the main mathematical derivations. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
In the classical North-South framework, the model is naturally divided into two 
parts, the North and the South, which are, nevertheless, linked by such activities that 
the South will imitate Northern innovation while with the Southern government faced 
with the problem to choose certain degree of IPR protection with purpose, on the one 
hand, of promoting economic growth with welfare improved, and, on the other hand, 
encouraging domestic innovation and respecting Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). Moreover, in each part of the model, endogenous innovation 
growth rate is concerned with its resulting consequences being thoroughly discussed. 
 
The North 
2.1. Final Production 
The final good sector employs labor and a set of intermediate goods as inputs. The 
technology for producing final good is represented by the following constant returns 
to scale production function, 
( )
1
0
( ) ( ) ( )
N
N NA tN N N NY t L x j djα αβ −= ∫ ,                                (1) 
where 0Nβ > , an exogenously given constant, represents productivity parameter, 
( )Nx j is the quantity of the intermediate good j with [0, ( )]Nj A t∈ , ( )NA t is the 
number of intermediate goods available at period t , NL is labor supply and is assumed 
to be fixed over time, and (0,1)Nα ∈ denotes the share of intermediate machines. As is 
shown in Furukawa (2007), this specification describes different inputs as imperfect 
substitutes, implying that no intermediate good is intrinsically better or worse than 
any other, irrespective of the time of introduction. 
 
2.2. Imitation Process 
As in the model of Helpman (1993), in order to investigate the consequences of a 
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tightening of IPR protection in the South, the costless imitation process reads as 
follows, 
1 1, ,( ) [ ( ) ( )]c S c SS NA t A t A tμ= − ,                                      (2) 
in which 0 Sμ≤ <∞ denotes the imitation rate or the hazard rate at which each 
product that has not been imitated yet is going to be imitated at the next date and 
hence a tightening of IPR protection in the South implies a decline of Sμ , i.e., Sμ is 
an inverse measure of IPR protection. Obviously, Sμ may be impacted and even 
determined by some other factors. However, we just, for simplicity and in order to 
effectively capture the economic intuition behind our model, focus those factors on 
certain degree of IPR protection. 1 , ( )( ( ))c S NA t A t≤ denotes the number of 
intermediates that have already been imitated by the South up to period t . And it is 
assumed that once an intermediate is imitated, it will become competitive. 
 
2.3. Intermediate Sector 
The intermediate good sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms, and 
technology is symmetric across varieties, that is, the production of one unit of 
intermediate good requires one unit of final good, which is assumed to be the 
numeraire. However, after the costless imitation process being introduced into the 
model, and hence once a product is imitated, the monopoly power of the original 
producer is lost and its price is pushed down to the marginal cost by competition. 
Accordingly, the prices of intermediate goods amount to, 
1
1
,
,
1, [0, ( )]
( )
1 , ( ( ), ( )]
c S
N
c SN N
j A t
p j
j A t A tα
⎧⎪ ∈⎪⎪=⎨⎪ ∈⎪⎪⎩
                              (3) 
And the corresponding demand functions are given by, 
1 1
1
, ,1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
,, 1 (1 ) 2 (1 )
( ) ( ) , [0, ( )]
( )
( ) ( ) , ( ( ), ( )]
N N
N N
c N c SN N N
N
c Sm N N N N N
x L j A t
x j
x L j A t A t
α α
α α
β α
β α
− −
− −
⎧⎪ ≡ ∈⎪⎪=⎨⎪ ≡ ∈⎪⎪⎩
           (4) 
And it is easy to see that the aggregate demand for intermediates can be expressed as 
follows, 
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{ }1 1 1( ) , , ,1 (1 )
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
N
NA t c N c S c SN N N NX t x j dj x A t A t A tαα −≡ = + −∫ ,     (5) 
 
2.4. Innovation Sector 
We introduce, following Helpman (1993), the following innovation process, 
( ) (0)
NN N g tA t A e= ,                                               (6) 
which implies that the North introduces new intermediates at a constant exogenous 
rate Ng . And thus it is easily seen that the fraction of goods that have not been 
imitated by the South reads as, 
1 ,( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )c SN N Nt A t A t A tζ = − , 
which evolves in accordance with the following differential equation, 
( ) ( ) ( )N N N S Nt g g tζ μ ζ= − + , 
And the solution of the ordinary differential equation (ODE) amounts to, 
( )( ) [ (0) ]
N SN N N N g tt e μζ ζ ζ ζ − += + − ,  ( )N N N Sg gζ μ= +               (7) 
where Nζ denotes the long-run steady state and (0)Nζ represents the exogenously given 
initial condition. Provided that developing a new variety requires Nb units of final 
good, and noting that in the next time interval of length dt , innovators that have not 
previously been imitated face the probability S dtμ ( dt is sufficiently small such 
that [0,1]S dtμ ∈ ) of being imitated, and thus the standard no arbitrage condition of the 
asset markets can be expressed as follows, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N N N S Nr t V t V t t V tπ μ− = − ,                               (8) 
which would be regarded as a Bellman type equation, where Nr is the nominal interest 
rate, NV is the value of the innovator, and Nπ is the monopolistic profits in the 
differentiated intermediates market. Furthermore, the free entry condition in the R&D 
markets implies that the present discounted value (PDV) of profits from innovation 
cannot exceed the entry cost Nb , i.e., ( )N NV t b= . Hence, the nominal interest rate is 
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constant over time and could be expressed as follows, 
,N m N Sr r μ= − ,                                                  (9) 
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
, (1 )( ) ( )
N N NN N N N
m N N N
N
Lr b
b
α α αα α βπ
+ − −−≡ = ,                 (9’) 
where ,m Nr denotes the instantaneous rate of return for innovation.  
 
2.5. Market Clearing for Final Good 
As usual, the final good is used for consumption, for production of intermediate 
products, and also for innovation. Consequently, the market clearing condition for the 
final good can be written as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N N N NY t C t X t b A t= + +  ,                                 (10) 
where Nb denotes the entry cost of R&D markets, NC represents the aggregate 
consumption and ( )NX t is given in (5). Inserting the demand functions in (4) into (1) 
produces, 
{ }1 1, ,1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]N N N N Nc S c SN N N N N NY t L A t A t A tα α α α αβ α α− − −= + − ,(11) 
Substituting (5), (6) and (11) into (10), then the following expression of aggregate 
consumption is immediately derived, 
( ){1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )( ) ( ) [( ) ( ) ] 1 ( ) ( )N N N NN N N N N N NC t L t A tα α α αβ α α ζ− − −= − −  
       }2 (1 ) 2 (1 )[( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )N N NN N N N N N Nt A t b g A tα α αα α ζ− −+ − − ,        (12) 
Hence, we obtain, 
1 2(0) (0)
N N N NC η ζ η= + ,                                           (13) 
Where 
{1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 )1 ( ) (0) [( ) ( ) ]N N N NN N N N N NL Aα α α αη β α α− − −≡ −  
     }(1 ) 1 (1 )[( ) ( ) ] 0N N NN Nα α αα α− −− − < ,                            (14) 
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
2 ( ) (0)[( ) ( ) ] (0)
N N N NN N N N N N N N NL A b g Aα α α αη β α α− − −≡ − − ,       (15) 
Noting that (0) 0NC ≥ , hence 2 0Nη > . 
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2.6. Representative Agent 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the abstract general equilibrium 
economy is populated by infinitely lived agent who derives utility from consumption 
and supplies inelastic labor. Agent is supposed to exhibit log preferences7 with 
perfect foresight and the corresponding dynamic maximization problem is given by, 
0 0{ ( )}
max ln ( )
N
N
t
N t N
C t
U e C t dtρ
≥
∞ −= ∫ , 
. .s t   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N N N N NB t r B t w t L C t= + − , 
in which 0Nρ > is the subjective discount factor, Nr is given in (9), NB is the value 
of asset holdings, NL is the constant labor supply and Nw is the equilibrium wage rate. 
Thus, the optimality condition, i.e., the standard Euler equation of consumption reads 
as follows, 
,( )
( )
N
N m N S N
C N
C t r
C t
γ μ ρ≡ = − − ,                                     (16) 
in which ,m Nr is defined in (9’) and NCγ  also denotes the equilibrium growth rate of the 
model economy. And as expected, the growth rate in (16) is a decreasing function of 
imitation rate thanks to the limited duration of the monopoly, thereby effectively 
reducing the private value of each innovation. Therefore, we conclude, only from the 
viewpoint of long-run economic growth, that a tightening of IPR protection in the 
South will benefit the North. 
 
2.7. The Welfare Effects of Southern IPR Protection to the North 
Notice from the previous section that, 
20
ln (0)ln ( )
( )
N
NN
N t N C
N N
CU e C t dtρ γρ ρ
∞ −= = +∫ ,                       (17) 
where (0)NC is given by (13). So if (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , i.e., the economy does not start from 
                                                        
7 It is easy to see that the specification of preference structure will not fundamentally change our following 
conclusions and hence choosing log preferences here is just for simplicity and convenience. 
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the steady state, thus we get, 
2
1 0
( )
N
S N
U
μ ρ
∂ =− <∂ ,  
Then we claim, 
PROPOSITION 1. Given above specifications, and if (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , then a tightening 
of intellectual property rights in the South, that is, a decline of the imitation rate, will 
exhibit positive welfare effect to the North. 
On the other hand, we restrict the analysis to economies that are initially in steady 
state; namely, (0) ( )N N N N Sg gζ ζ μ= = + , then in view of (13) and (14) shows that, 
1
2
(0) 0
( )
N NN
S N S
gC
g
η
μ μ
∂ =− >∂ + , 
And so, by (17), the following first order condition immediately, 
2
1 (0) 1 0
(0) ( )
N N
S N N S N
U C
Cμ ρ μ ρ
∂ ∂= − =∂ ∂ , 
2
2 1 1( ) ( ) 0
N N S N N N S N N Ng g g gη μ η μ η ρ⇔ + + + + = , 
Thus, we obtain, 
2
1 1 2 1
1
2
( ) 4
2
N N N N N N N N
N
N
g g g
g
η η η η ρμ η
∗ − + −= − ,                       (18) 
Moreover, noting by (14) that, 
22 2
2 2 2
1 (0) 1 (0) 0
( ) [ (0)] (0) ( )
N N N
S N N S N N S
U C C
C Cμ ρ μ ρ μ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥=− + <⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
, 
Therefore, we conclude that, 
PROPOSITION 2. Based on the above assumptions, then in the short run of the 
economy, there must exist an optimal level of IPR protection 1μ∗ , which is defined in 
(18) and is independent of (0)NA , such that the welfare of the North is maximized. 
REMARK. We have proved that there exists an optimal degree of IPR protection in 
the South such that the welfare of the North is maximized in certain conditions, which 
are rather weak. That is to say, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
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welfare function of the North and the inverse measure of IPR protection in the South. 
In other words, there is a critical value of Sμ denoted by 1μ∗ defined in (18), and 
when 1
Sμ μ∗< , a tightening of IPR protection will hurt the North but when 1Sμ μ∗> , a 
tightening of IPR protection will improve the welfare of the North. 
Finally, a comparison of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 shows that, under certain 
conditions, the short-run welfare effect of IPR protection in the South would be totally 
different from the other non-short-run, say, midterm-run or long-run, welfare effects. 
In particular, a tightening of IPR protection may factually improve the long-run 
welfare of the North while reducing its short-run welfare. 
 
2.8. Endogenous Innovation Growth Rate 
First of all, we still employ the following innovation process, 
( ) (0)
NN N g tA t A e= , 
Then, assume that developing ( )NA t new varieties requiresn( )Nb t units of final good. 
And, in particular, n( )Nb t is given by, 
n 1( )( ) ( )
( 1)
NN
N N
N N
gb t A t
v
σ
σ
+
≡
+
, 
where 1Nσ > is an exogenously given constant such that n2 2( ) ( ) 0N Nb t g∂ ∂ > and it is 
in line with the classical specification of cost function in microeconomics, 
n( ) ( ) 0N Nb t A t∂ ∂ > reflects the fact that existing innovations will to some extent make 
new innovation more difficult 8 , and 0Nv > denotes the productivity parameter, 
including accumulation of experience following from learning by doing (e.g., Arrow, 
1962; Young, 1993; Stein, 1997) and “standing on the shoulder of giants” (see, 
Scotchmer, 1991) and so on. All in all, the specification reveals the idea or the fact 
that technological process or technical innovation will play a critical role in 
                                                        
8 Segerstrom (1998) specifically uses similar specification to successfully remove out the so-called “scale effects” 
noted and analyzed by Jones (1995) in R&D-based models. 
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maintaining barriers to entry and therefore impacting market structure (see, Levin, 
1978). And market structure in turn will greatly shape the technological processes. 
Thus, the expected profit maximization problem facing the innovator is defined as 
follows, 
n
0 1
max (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N
S N N N
g
dt A t t b tμ π
< <
− − , 
where (1 )S dtμ− denotes the probability of not being imitated in the next dt length of 
time interval. Solving the static maximization problem yields, 
1
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 )( ) (1 )
N
N N NN N N N N N Sg L v dt
σα α αβ α α μ− + −⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,             (19) 
from which we see that 0N Sg μ∂ ∂ < , and just in this sense of (19), we claim that 
innovation growth rate Ng is endogenously determined. And since developing a new 
variety requiresn( ) ( )N Nb t A t units of final good. Thus, combining (9) with (9’), the 
following nominal interest rate is derived, 
,N m N Sr r μ= − ,    
n (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ), (1 )( ) ( 1) ( )( ) ( )
( )
N N N
N
N N N N N N
m N N N N
N
v Lr A t b t
g
α α α
σ
α α σ βπ
+ − −− +≡ = ,    
where ,m Nr denotes the instantaneous rate of return for innovation. Notice from (16)  
that the standard Euler equation of the representative consumer is expressed as, 
,( )
( )
N
N m N S N
C N
C t r
C t
γ μ ρ≡ = − − , 
To make the notations more compact, we put, 
,
3 ( )
Nm N N Nr g ση= , 
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
3 (1 )( ) ( 1) ( )
N N NN N N N N N Nv Lα α αη α α σ β+ − −≡ − + , 
And, 
1
4 (1 )
N
N N Sg dt
ση μ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
4 (1 )( ) ( )
N N NN N N N N Nv Lα α αη α α β+ − −≡ − , 
Notice that 3 4( 1)
N N Nη σ η= + . And thus we can easily get, 
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2 2
4( 1)( ) ( ) 1 0
N
N
N N NC
S g dt
σγ σ ημ
−∂ = + − =∂
1 ( 1)NS dt
dt
σμ − +⇔ = , 
Where 
1 ( 1) 10
1
N
N
dt
dt
dt
σ
σ
− +
> ⇔ <
+
, 
Therefore, we conclude the following proposition, 
PROPOSITION 3. Given the endogenous innovation growth rate defined in (19), 
there is a critical value of the inverse measure of IPR protection, 
1 ( 1)S N dt dtμ σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , provided 1 ( 1)
Ndt σ< +  so that, 
1 ( 1) ,
0
1 ( 1) ,
S NN
C
S
N
dt dt
dt
μ σγ
μ σ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤⎪ − +⎪∂ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎣ ⎦⇔ ⎨⎪∂ ⎪ < +⎪⎩
P
P  
That is, there is a U-shaped relationship between the Northern equilibrium growth 
rate and the Southern IPR protection. 
REMARK. It follows from (16) that a strengthening of Southern IPR protection 
will always promote the long-run economic growth of the North. However, after 
innovation growth rate being endogenously concerned, there is a U-shaped 
relationship between the Northern equilibrium growth rate and the Southern IPR 
protection, i.e., a tightening of Southern IPR protection may inevitably retard the 
Northern economic growth, due to Proposition 3. 
Moreover, noting that if (0)N Nζ ζ= , then by (19), 
2 2
(0) 0
( ) ( )
N S N N
S N S S N S
g g
g g
ζ μ
μ μ μ μ
∂ ∂= − <∂ + ∂ + , 
Hence, by (13), (14), (15) and (19), and noting that n( ) ( )N N Nb b t A t=  , 
1
(0) (0) (0) ( ) 0
N
N N N N
N N
S S N S
C A gg
v
σζημ μ μ
∂ ∂ ∂= − >∂ ∂ ∂ , 
On the other hand, if (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , then, 
    (0) (0) ( ) 0
N
N N N
N
S N S
C A gg
v
σ
μ μ
∂ ∂=− >∂ ∂ ,                               (20) 
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So from (17) we see that, 
2
1 (0) 1 0
(0) ( )
NN N
C
S N N S N S
U C
C
γ
μ ρ μ ρ μ
∂∂ ∂= + >∂ ∂ ∂ ,                          (21) 
holds true for both (0)N Nζ ζ= and (0)N Nζ ζ≠ provided 0N SCγ μ∂ ∂ > .  
Therefore, combining with Proposition 3, we get, 
PROPOSITION 4. If 1 ( 1)S N dt dtμ σ⎡ ⎤≥ − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ with 1 ( 1)
Ndt σ< + , then we easily 
get 0N SU μ∂ ∂ > for both (0)N Nζ ζ= and (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , that is, a tightening of IPR 
protection in the South, i.e., a decreasing of Sμ , will reduce the welfare of the North. 
REMARK. Interesting should it be to notice that Helpman (1993) shows that 
tighter intellectual property rights also hurt the North whenever economies begin in 
steady state with small rates of imitation, however, it is shown, after the innovation 
growth rate being endogenously concerned, that a tightening of Southern IPR 
protection will definitely hurt the North when the imitation rate is above one critical 
value whenever the economies begin in steady state or begin in non-steady state. 
Moreover, it would be remarkable that, after incorporating endogenous innovation 
growth rate into the current model, a comparison of Proposition 4 with Proposition 1 
and Proposition 2 shows that the Northern welfare effects with respect to Southern 
choice of IPR protection would be totally different. And we may further claim that 
endogenous innovation growth rate in the North would result in a much subtler 
relationship between Southern IPR protection and Northern welfare. 
 
The South 
2.9. Final Good Production 
Different from the North, here we specify the following production function for 
the competitive firms, 
,1( ) ( )
1 1
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c SS
S S S SA t A tS S S S SY t L x j dj z j djα α α αβ − −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ Θ ,           (22) 
where 0Sβ > is the productivity parameter, ( )Sx j is the quantity of the intermediate 
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good j , [0, ( )]Sj A t∈ , while ( )Sz j is the quantity of the intermediate good j , 
1 ,[0, ( )]c Sj A t∈ , 1 , ( )c SA t is defined in (2) and ( )SA t is the number of intermediate 
goods invented by Southern domestic firms up to time t , NL is constant labor supply 
and (0,1)Sα ∈ denotes the share of intermediate products. What’s more, [0,1]∈Θ is an   
exogenous parameter that reflects the match level of intermediate j , 1 ,[0, ( )]c Sj A t∈ , to 
the final production. And hence, rather, we take ( )Sx j and ( )Sz j as the corresponding 
quantities of different (e.g., in the sense of production technology) intermediates 
which belong to[0, ( )]SA t and 1,[0, ( )]c SA t , respectively. Moreover, the exponent onΘ is 
just for computation convenience. 
 
2.10. Imitation Process 
Besides the costless imitation process introduced in (2), we define the following 
another costless imitation process, 
2 2, ,( ) [ ( ) ( )]c S c SS SA t A t A tμ= − ,                                     (23) 
where 0 Sμ≤ <∞ represents the hazard rate and also is an inverse measure of IPR 
protection. 2 , ( )c SA t is the number of intermediates invented by firms in the South that 
have already been imitated by other domestic firms. And as is specified in the North, 
once an intermediate good is imitated, it will become competitive. 
REMARK. It is mentioned in Introduction that the Southern imitation has been 
naturally divided into two types, efficient imitation and inefficient imitation. It is 
especially worth emphasizing here is that the standard of efficiency is not in the sense 
of consumer welfare but just in the sense of final output. Therefore, it is natural, via 
combining (22) and (23), to see that the imitation activities introduced in (23) are 
actually inefficient, whereas the imitation activities shown in (2) are efficient and their 
efficiency level depends on the parameter [0,1]∈Θ . 
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2.11. Intermediate Sector 
With concerning of the imitation process introduced in previous section, the 
intermediate products can be naturally divided into two groups: the imitated, 
2 ,[0, ( )]c SA t , and the monopolized, 2 ,( ( ), ( )]c S SA t A t . Therefore, based on the 
technology assumption that one unit of intermediate good requires one unit of final 
good, assumed to be the numeraire, the optimal quantities and prices set, according to 
the principle that marginal revenue equals marginal cost, by the monopolists are, 
2 2
2
, ,1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
,, 1 (1 ) 2 (1 )
( ) ( ) , [0, ( )]
( )
( ) ( ) , ( ( ), ( )]
S S
S S
c S c SS S S
S
c Sm S S S S S
x L j A t
x j
x L j A t A t
α α
α α
β α
β α
− −
− −
⎧⎪ ≡ ∈⎪⎪=⎨⎪ ≡ ∈⎪⎪⎩
           (24) 
1 1, ,1 (1 ) 1 (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) , [0, ( )]
S Sc S c SS S S Sz j z L j A tα αβ α− −= ≡ ∈Θ            (25) 
and, 
2
2
1
,
,
,
1, [0, ( )]
( ) 1 , ( ( ), ( )]
1, [0, ( )]
c S
c SS S S
c S
j A t
p j j A t A t
j A t
α
⎧⎪ ∈⎪⎪⎪⎪= ∈⎨⎪⎪⎪ ∈⎪⎪⎩
                            (26) 
respectively. Although we take 1,[0, ( )]c Sj A t∈ and 2 ,[0, ( )]c Sj A t∈ as totally different 
intermediates from the viewpoint of technology match to the final production and 
hence output contribution, we treat them equally in prices as is shown in (26) since 
they are all competitive in the same markets9, from which the prices in (26) would be 
regarded as, to some extent, reasonable and acceptable. And most importantly, this 
assumption is far from being playing a determinant role in the current model. So the 
aggregate demand for intermediates amounts to, 
,1( ) ( )
0 0
( ) ( ) ( )
c SSA t A t
S S SX t x j dj z j dj≡ +∫ ∫  
{ }2 2 1, , ,1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )S S Sc S c S c SS S S S SL A t A t A t A tα α αβ α α− − −= + − +Θ , 
(27) 
2.12. Innovation Sector 
                                                        
9 In particular, they share the same marginal cost, i.e., one unit of final good. And thus, there are not any arbitrage 
opportunities in the Southern imitation sector. Moreover, even though they don’t share the same marginal cost 
initially, long-run competition (perfect competition assumption) definitely pulls back the economy to stay in an 
equilibrium without any arbitrage opportunities, therefore, we, initially, without loss of generality, suppose that the 
economy is just lying in the above long-run equilibrium. 
  18
As for the North, we employ the following innovation process10, 
( ) (0)
SS S g tA t A e= ,                                              (28) 
where (0) 0SA > denotes the initial level of innovation and Sg is an exogenously given 
growth rate. The fraction of intermediate goods that have not been imitated can thus 
be characterized, following Helpman (1993), by the following differential equation, 
( ) ( ) ( )S S S S St g g tζ μ ζ= − + ,                                      (29) 
And its solution is given as, 
( )( ) [ (0) ]
S SS S S S g tt e μζ ζ ζ ζ − += + − , ( )S S S Sg gζ μ= +                 (30) 
where Sζ denotes the long-run steady state of the dynamic system. Davidson and 
Segerstrom (1998) present an endogenous growth model and find that only innovative 
R&D subsidies lead to faster economic growth while imitative R&D subsidies 
actually lead to slower economic growth. Hence, we, in line with Davidson and 
Segerstrom (1998), only incorporate subsidy policy into innovation sector and thus 
suppose that developing a new variety requires (1 )S SA bτ− 11 , in 
which (0,1)SAτ ∈ denotes the subsidy rate to innovation from the Southern 
government, units of final good. And the standard no arbitrage condition for the asset 
markets can be written as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,0 1
( ) ( )
S S
S S S S
S S
t V t r t
V t V t
π μ φ φ+ = + + < < ,                          (31) 
where Sr is the nominal interest rate, Sφ denotes the risk cost induced by the 
immaturity of the Southern financial markets, SV is the value of the innovator, 
and Sπ is the monopolistic profits in the differentiated intermediates market. Then, 
using the free entry condition in the R&D markets, the nominal interest rate reads as, 
,S m S S Sr r μ φ= − − ,                                             (32) 
                                                        
10 Some papers (see Howitt (1999) for instance) assume that there are two kinds of innovation, horizontal and 
vertical, in their models. Here we only consider horizontal innovation due to our specification of the model. 
11 As is shown in existing literatures (e.g., Spence, 1984; Spencer and Brander, 1983), we also employ 
cost-reducing innovation subsidy. 
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(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
, (1 )( ) ( )
(1 )
S S S
S
S S S S
m S
S
A
Lr
b
α α αα α β
τ
+ − −−= − ,                           (33) 
where , (1 )Sm S S SAr bπ τ≡ − denotes the instantaneous rate of return for innovation and 
it is an increasing function of the subsidy rate to innovation. 
 
2.13. Market Clearing for the Final Good 
Notice that the final good is used for consumption, for production of intermediate 
machines, and for innovation, the market clearing condition can therefore be written 
as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )SS S S S SAY t C t X t b A tτ= + + −  ,                            (34) 
in which SC represents the aggregate consumption and ( )SX t is given in (27). 
Substituting (24) and (25) into (22) produces, 
{ }2 2 1, , ,1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]+ ( )S S S S Sc S c S c SS S S S S SY t L A t A t A t A tα α α α αβ α α− − −= + − Θ                 
(35) 
And so substituting (27), (28) and (35) into (34) yields, 
{ }1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )( ) ( ) [( ) ( ) ] [( ) ( ) ]S S S S S S SS S S S S S SC t Lα α α α α α αβ α α α α− − − − −= − − −  
       1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) [( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )
S S S SS S S S S S N Nt A t L t A tα α α αζ β α α ζ− − −× − −Θ   
       1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )( ) [( ) ( ) ][ ( ) ( )]
S S S SS S S S S NL A t A tα α α αβ α α− − −+ − +Θ  
        (1 ) ( )S S S SA b g A tτ− −                                      (36) 
Then, we obtain,  
1 2 3 4(0) (0) (0) (1 )S
S S S S N S S
A
C η ζ η ζ η η τ= + + − − ,                        (37) 
Where 
{1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 )1 ( ) (0) [( ) ( ) ]S S S SS S S S S SL Aα α α αη β α α− − −≡ −  
    }(1 ) 1 (1 )[( ) ( ) ] 0S S SS Sα α αα α− −− − < ,                              (38) 
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
2 ( ) (0)[( ) ( ) ] 0
S S S SS S S N S SL Aα α α αη β α α− − −≡ − <Θ ,               (39) 
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1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
3 ( ) [( ) ( ) ][ (0) (0)] 0
S S S SS S S S S S NL A Aα α α αη β α α− − −≡ − + >Θ ,       (40) 
4 (0) 0
S S S Sb g Aη ≡ > ,                                            (41) 
Hence, we get, 
N1 2 3 4
00 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (1 )SS S S S N S S AC η ζ η ζ η η τ
>≤ ≤ <
= + + +− −	
 	
 	
 ,                     (37’) 
 
2.14. Representative Agent 
As usual, the dynamic maximization problem for the representative agent is given 
as, 
0 0{ ( )}
max ln ( )
S
S
t
S t S
C t
U e C t dtρ
≥
∞ −= ∫ ,  
. .s t   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S S S S S S SB t r B t w t L C t T= + − − ,                        (42) 
where 0Sρ > is the subjective discount factor, SB is the value of asset holdings, Sw is 
the equilibrium wage rate, and ST is the lump-sum tax. Thus, the standard Euler 
equation of consumption reads as follows, 
,( )
( )
S
S m S S S S
C S
C t r
C t
γ μ φ ρ≡ = − − − ,                                  (43) 
from which we find that, just from the point of view of long-run economic growth, 
both a tightening of IPR protection and an increasing of the rate of innovation subsidy, 
provided the lump-sun taxation and ceteris paribus, will benefit the South12. 
REMARK. Noting that our theme is not optimal taxation theory, we only introduce 
lump-sum tax into our model as the unique resource of governmental subsidy to 
innovation. However, it is predictable that the discussion of optimal innovation 
subsidy will immediately become very complicated after incorporating both 
government balanced budget constraint and some other linear taxes, say, income tax 
and consumption tax, into the present model. 
 
                                                        
12 Gould and Gruben (1996), indeed, find that stronger intellectual property rights protection corresponds to 
higher economic growth rates in a cross-country sample. 
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2.15. Government 
In this section, specifically, both Ng and Sg are assumed to be exogenously given. 
It follows from (37) and (43) that, the welfare (or utility) function of the South can be 
expressed as, 
20
ln (0)ln ( )
( )
S
SS
S t S C
S S
CU e C t dtρ γρ ρ
∞ −= = +∫ ,                        (44) 
Hence, if (0)S Sζ ζ≠ and (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , then, 
2
1 0
( )
S
S S
U
μ ρ
∂ =− <∂ , 
If (0)S Sζ ζ≠ and (0)N Nζ ζ= , then by (7), (37), (39) and (44), we have the following 
first order condition (FOC), 
2
2 2
1 0
(0)( ) ( )
S NS
S S S N S S
gU
C g
η
μ ρ μ ρ
−∂ = − =∂ + , 
2
5 2 2( ) ( ) 0
S N S S N N S S N Sg g g gη μ η μ η ρ⇔ + + + + = . 
where 5 1 3 4(0) (1 )S
S S S S S
A
η η ζ η η τ≡ + − − . Noting that (0) 0SC ≥ and thus it is easy to see 
that 5 0
Sη > by (37’). Thus, we have, 
2
2 2 2 5
2
5
( ) 4
2
S N S N S N S S
N
S
g g g
g
η η η η ρμ η
∗ − + −= − ,                         (45) 
whose optimality is fully ensured by the following second order condition, 
22
2
2 2 3
21 (0) 0
( ) [ (0)] (0)( )
S NS S
S S S S S S N S
gU C
C C g
η
μ ρ μ ρ μ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥=− + <⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ +⎣ ⎦
, 
by (39).If (0)S Sζ ζ= and (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , then by (30), (37), (38) and (44), we get the 
following FOC, 
1
2 2
1 0
(0)( ) ( )
S SS
S S S S S S
gU
C g
η
μ ρ μ ρ
−∂ = − =∂ + , 
2
6 1 1( ) ( ) 0
S S S S S S S S S Sg g g gη μ η μ η ρ⇔ + + + + = . 
where 6 2 3 4(0) (1 ) 0S
S S N S S
A
η η ζ η η τ≡ + − − > . Noting that (0) 0SC ≥ and thus 6 0Sη > by 
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(37’). Therefore, we obtain, 
2
1 1 1 6
3
6
( ) 4
2
S S S S S S S S
S
S
g g g
g
η η η η ρμ η
∗ − + −= − ,                          (46) 
And meanwhile noting from (38) that, 
22
1
2 2 3
21 (0) 0
( ) [ (0)] (0)( )
S SS S
S S S S S S S S
gU C
C C g
η
μ ρ μ ρ μ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥=− + <⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ +⎣ ⎦
, 
Moreover, if (0)S Sζ ζ= and (0)N Nζ ζ= , then by (7), (30), (37), (38), (39) and (44), 
we get the following FOC, 
1 2
2 2
1
(0)( ) (0)( )
S S S N
S S S S N S S
g g
C g C g
η η
μ μ ρ
−+ =
+ +
- , 
If N Sg g= , then we get, 
2
7 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
S S S S S S S S S S S Sg g g gη μ η η μ η η ρ+ + + + + + = , 
where 7 3 4 (1 )S
S S S
A
η η η τ≡ − − , and it follows from (37’) that 7 0Sη > always holds true. 
Hence, we obtain, 
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 7
4
7
( ) ( ) ( ) 4( )
2
S S S S S S S S S S S
S
S
g g g
g
η η η η η η η ρμ η
∗ − + + + − += − ,        (47) 
Further notice that, by (38), (39), and N Sg g= , then the following second order 
condition is clearly fulfilled, 
22
1 2
2 2 3
2( )1 (0) 0
( ) [ (0)] (0)( )
S S SS S
S S S S S S S S
gU C
C C g
η η
μ ρ μ ρ μ
⎡ ⎤ +∂ − ∂⎢ ⎥= + <⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ +⎣ ⎦
, 
Accordingly, we conclude that, 
PROPOSITION 5. (i) If (0)S Sζ ζ≠ and (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , then a tightening of intellectual 
property rights protection will improve the welfare of the South. 
  (ii) If (0)S Sζ ζ≠ , (0)N Nζ ζ= , then there is an optimal level of IPR protection given 
in (45) for the South. 
  (iii) If (0)S Sζ ζ= , (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , then there exists an optimal level of IPR protection 
given in (46) for the South. 
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  (iv) If (0)S Sζ ζ= , (0)N Nζ ζ= and N Sg g= , thus we see that there is an optimal 
degree of IPR protection, defined in (47), for the South. 
REMARK. Proposition 5(i) shows that a strengthening of IPR protection will 
definitely improve the welfare of the South, given exogenous innovation growth, in 
the non-short run of the economies. It is, one the one hand, different from the point 
insisted by Chin and Grossman (1990), Deardorff (1992) and Schneider (2005) that a 
tightening of IPR protection will surely hurt the South, and on the other hand, 
different from the illustration of the existence of an optimal degree of IPR protection 
shown in Kwan and Lai (2003), Furukawa (2007) and Horri and Iwaisako (2007). 
Thus, we argue, regardless of the specificity of model specification, that we have 
provided the conditions under which a tightening of IPR protection will definitely 
improve the Southern welfare in general expanding-variety models and in the 
classical North-South framework. 
Helpman (1993), provided that the South just imitates the new products invented 
by the North, proved that the South will lose from tighter intellectual property rights 
in the short run of the economies, however, after introducing Southern innovation 
activities into the framework resembles to Helpman (1993), Proposition 5(iv) shows 
conditions based upon which there is an optimal degree of IPR protection, i.e., the 
South may gain from tighter intellectual property rights, in the short run of the 
economies. 
On the other hand, notice that, by (33), (37), (41) and (44), 
,
4
2 0(0) ( ) (1 )S S
SS m S
S S S
A A
U r
C
η
τ ρ ρ τ
∂ = + >∂ − , 
Therefore, we summarize, 
PROPOSITION 6. Given the specification of lump-sum taxation, an increasing of 
the subsidy rate to innovation will definitely improve the welfare of the South. 
REMARK. The economic intuition of this Proposition can be summarized as 
follows: first, lump-sum taxation exhibits no distortion effects and hence consumption 
process is not affected for given initial level of consumption; second, an increasing of 
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the subsidy rate to innovation implies an increasing of intermediates provided there is 
not any “crowding-out effect”, and the quantity of efficient imitation would keep 
unchanged, if not increased, for given level of technology matchΘ and IPR protection 
in the short-run or midterm-run of the economy, therefore, final output, i.e., national 
income, would definitely increase. And hence budget constraint line may probably 
move out (ceteris paribus) for a given increasing of lump-sum tax, which, rather, 
supports an increasing of consumption and so welfare via combining with the first 
point mentioned above. 
Moreover, we obtain the following proposition, 
PROPOSITION 7. Given the optimal degree of IPR protection 2μ∗ defined in (45), we 
have 2 0SAμ τ∗∂ ∂ < and 2 0Sgμ∗∂ ∂ > , that is to say, there is complementarity between 
the optimal degree of IPR protection and the subsidy rate to innovation, and the 
smaller of Sg the tighter of optimal degree of IPR protection in the South, respectively. 
PROOF. See Appendix A. 
REMARK. For the Southern government, the dual 2( , )SAμ τ∗ would be an efficient 
policy combination thanks to Proposition 7. And we insist that Proposition 7 indeed 
throws light on our understanding of policy or institutional choice of the South. Firstly, 
noting that a decreasing of Sg implies a decreasing of domestic innovation for any 
given initial level (0)SA , the corresponding optimal degree of IPR protection hence 
should be higher via noting that one goal of the South is encouraging domestic 
innovation. However, a tightening of IPR protection will reduce its efficient imitation 
activities by noting the fact that Sμ does not affect ( )NA t when Ng and (0)NA are 
exogenously given constants. Thus, a tightening of IPR protection, by combining the 
above two opposing effects, may and also may not reduce the final output or national 
income of the South. However, Proposition 7 clearly confirms that the former positive 
effect will dominate the later negative effect (ceteris paribus) of a given tightening of 
IPR protection, i.e., a decreasing of Sg inevitably implies a strengthening of IPR 
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protection. 
For 3μ∗ , the following proposition is derived, 
PROPOSITION 8. Given the existence of the optimal degree of IPR protection 
3μ∗ defined in (46), then we get 3 0SAμ τ∗∂ ∂ < and 3 0μ∗∂ ∂ <Θ , that is, there is 
complementarity between the optimal degree of IPR protection and the subsidy rate to 
innovation, and the higher the level of technology match the tighter the optimal IPR 
protection, respectively. 
PROOF. See Appendix B. 
Moreover, we obtain the following proposition, 
PROPOSITION 9. Conditional on the existence of the optimal degree of IPR 
protection 4μ∗ defined in (47), then we get 4 0SAμ τ∗∂ ∂ < , that is, there is 
complementarity between the optimal degree of IPR protection and the subsidy rate to 
innovation. 
PROOF. See Appendix C. 
REMARK. For policy-makers, capturing the internal reactive mechanisms between 
different policy variables should be of great importance. Proposition 7, Proposition 8 
and Proposition 9 consistently show that the policy instruments for Southern 
government are not independent of each other, and particularly, the optimal degree of 
IPR protection is endogenously determined by the rate of innovation subsidy SAτ . 
That is to say, SAτ not only directly acts on the equilibrium growth rate of the 
economy but also indirectly acts on the equilibrium growth rate via directly acting 
on Sμ . Now, suppose that 2μ∗ (or 3μ∗ , 4μ∗ ) seems somewhat large due to other 
parameters 13  such asΘ , Sg and Ng , etc, hence the Southern government can 
effectively decrease the value of 2μ∗ (or 3μ∗ , 4μ∗ ) (ceteris paribus) by a sufficient 
increasing of SAτ , and vise verse. And just in this case and in this sense, we insist, as is 
argued in Introduction, that subsidy policy would effectively relax the tension facing 
the Southern government. 
                                                        
13 These parameters are not control variables for the government. 
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2.16. Endogenous Innovation Growth Rate 
First, we still use the following innovation process, 
( ) (0)
SS S g tA t A e= , 
Then, suppose that developing ( )SA t new varieties requires n(1 ) ( )S SA b tτ− units of final 
goods. And, in particular, n( )Sb t is defined as, 
n 1( )( ) ( )
( 1)
SS
S S
S S
gb t A t
v
σ
σ
+
≡
+
,  
where 1Sσ > is an exogenously given constant, and Sv denotes the productivity 
parameter. Therefore, the static maximization problem facing the innovator is given 
by, 
n
0 1
max (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )SS
S S S S
Ag
dt A t t b tμ π τ
< <
− − − , 
where (1 )S dtμ− represents the probability of not being imitated by other domestic 
firms in the next dt length of time interval. Solving the static maximization problem 
gives, 
1
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 )( ) (1 )
1
S
S S S
S
S S S S S S
S
A
L v dtg
σα α αβ α α μ
τ
− + −⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,               (48) 
from which we see that Sg is an increasing function14  of SAτ and meanwhile a 
decreasing function of Sμ , and just in this sense of (48), we call Sg the endogenous 
innovation growth rate. As is required, developing a new variety 
employs n(1 ) ( ) ( )S S SA b t A tτ−  units of final good. Thus, the nominal interest rate can 
be rewritten as, 
,S m S Sr r μ= − ,    
                                                        
14 The point worth emphasizing here is that government subsidization of R&D should invoke “additionality 
effect” while it is also possible that it will “crowd out” private financing of R&D (e.g., Görg and Strobl, 2007). 
Therefore, the innovation growth rate may and may not be an increasing function of governmental subsidy rate. To 
make things easier, here in the present paper we don’t take the so-called “crowding-out effect” into account. 
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(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
, (1 )( ) ( 1) ( )
(1 )( )
S S S
S
S
S S S S S S
m S
S
A
v Lr
g
α α α
σ
α α σ β
τ
+ − −− += − ,    
where ,m Sr denotes the instantaneous rate of return for innovation. And note from (43) 
that the standard Euler equation for the representative agent reads as, 
,( )
( )
S
S m S S S S
C S
C t r
C t
γ μ φ ρ≡ = − − − , 
To make the notations more compact, we put, 
,
9 (1 )( )
S
S
m S S S
A
r g ση τ= − , 
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
9 (1 )( ) ( 1) ( )
S S SS S S S S S Sv Lα α αη α α σ β+ − −≡ − + , 
And, 
1
10 (1 )
1
S
S
S S
S
A
dtg
ση μ
τ
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
10 (1 )( ) ( )
S S SS S S S S Sv Lα α αη α α β+ − −≡ − , 
So we find that 9 10( 1)
S S Sη σ η= + . Notice that, 
110 ( ) 0
(1 )
S
S
SS
S
S S
A
dtg g σημ σ τ
−−∂ = <∂ −  , 
Then, 
2
10
2 2
( 1)( ) 1 0
(1 ) ( )
S
S
S S S
C
S S
A
dt
g σ
γ σ η
μ τ
∂ += − =∂ −  , 
which implies that, 
1 ( 1)SS dt
dt
σμ − += , 
And since, 
2 2
10
2 2 2 1
2 ( 1)( ) 0
( ) (1 ) ( )
S
S
S S S S S
C
S SS
A
dt g
g σ
γ σ σ η
μ μτ +
∂ − + ∂= >∂ ∂−  , 
Accordingly, we summarize the following proposition, 
PROPOSITION 10. Conditional on the endogenous innovation growth rate defined 
in (48), then there is a critical value of the inverse measure of IPR protection, 
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1 ( 1)S S dt dtμ σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , provided that 1 ( 1)
Sdt σ< + so that, 
1 ( 1) ,
0
1 ( 1) ,
S SS
C
S
S
dt dt
dt
μ σγ
μ σ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤⎪ − +⎪∂ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎣ ⎦⇔ ⎨⎪∂ ⎪ < +⎪⎩
P
P  
That is, there is a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium growth rate and the IPR 
protection. 
REMARK. It is worth noting that there should be a U-shaped relationship between 
equilibrium growth rate and the IPR protection after innovation growth rate being 
endogenously concerned while it follows from (43) that a tightening of IPR protection 
always implies an increasing of equilibrium growth rate. Proposition 10, indeed, is 
consistent with Chen and Puttitanun (2005)’s conclusion following from their 
empirical analysis with a panel data for 64 developing countries. 
On the other hand, since, 
110
2
(1 ) ( ) 0
(1 )
S
S S
S SS
S
S
A A
dtg g ση μτ τ σ
−−∂ = >∂ − , 
Thus, by (48), 
9 10
2
(1 )1 0
(1 ) ( ) (1 )( )
S S
S S S
S S S S
C
S S
A A A
dt
g gσ σ
γ η η μ
τ τ τ
⎡ ⎤∂ −⎢ ⎥= − =⎢ ⎥∂ − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
So we have, 
PROPOSITION 11. Based on the endogenous innovation growth rate given by (48), 
then we get 0SSC Aγ τ∂ ∂ = , i.e., the equilibrium growth rate of the economy is 
independent of the subsidy rate to innovation. 
REMARK. Interesting should it be that, conditional on the endogenous innovation 
growth rate shown in (48), we see by Proposition 11 that the equilibrium growth rate 
is independent of the subsidy rate to innovation, which is in accord with the 
conclusion from Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998). Nonetheless, it is obviously 
shown by (43) that an increasing of the rate of innovation subsidy, provided the 
lump-sum taxation and ceteris paribus, will always imply a resulting increasing of 
equilibrium growth rate, which resembles to the results from Howitt (1999, 2000). To 
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sum up, it is endogenous innovation growth that leads us from Howitt (1999, 2000) to 
Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998) in the current general expanding-variety model. 
Moreover, we have, 
PROPOSITION 12. Conditional on the endogenous innovation growth rate 
Sg defined by (48), and if 1 ( 1)S S dt dtμ σ⎡ ⎤≥ − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ with 1 ( 1)
Sdt σ< + , then we 
always get 0S SU μ∂ ∂ > , i.e., a tightening of IPR protection would hurt the South. 
PROOF. See Appendix D. 
REMARK. A comparison of Proposition 5(i) and Proposition 12 shows that 
endogenous innovation growth will make the corresponding welfare effect of a 
tightening of IPR protection totally changed. And that’s why we emphasize in the 
Introduction that the case of exogenous innovation growth and that of endogenous 
innovation growth should be comparatively studied. 
Intuitively, by (44) we see that the welfare SU positively depends on the initial 
consumption (0)SC and the equilibrium growth rate of consumption SCγ . Provided 
that (0)S Sζ ζ≠ and (0)N Nζ ζ≠ , thus, in the exogenous case, (0)SC is independent 
of Sμ by (37)-(41) with SCγ negatively depends on Sμ by (43). So the marginal effect 
of SU with respect to Sμ will be negative, i.e., 0S SU μ∂ ∂ < . However, in the 
endogenous case, the proof of Proposition 12 shows that the initial 
consumption (0)SC always positively depends on Sμ , i.e., a strengthening of IPR 
protection will definitively reduce the initial level of consumption. This may, 
unavoidably, sound strange and unbelievable15 even though it’s not the focus here. 
The key point here is that endogenous innovation growth would probably result 
in 0S SCγ μ∂ ∂ > . And it is this combining with (0) 0S SC μ∂ ∂ > that inevitably leads 
us to the conclusion shown in Proposition 12. To further our analyses, the crucial 
point that induces the change from 0S SCγ μ∂ ∂ < to 0S SCγ μ∂ ∂ > totally bases on the 
                                                        
15 The relationship may be very ambiguous in reality. 
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fact that ,m Sr , instantaneous rate of return for innovation, now, positively depends 
on Sμ while in the exogenous case ,m Sr is just independent of Sμ . As a matter of fact, 
we have the following logic diagram for endogenous innovation growth, 
n ,( ) ( )S S S S N m Sg b b t A t rμ ↓⇒ ↑⇒ = ↑⇒ ↓ ( ∀ given Sπ ) SCγ⇒ ↓ (ceteris paribus) 
And that’s the whole story. Obviously, the key point is“ n( ) ( )S S S Ng b b t A t↑⇒ = ↑ ”, 
i.e., an increasing of the growth rate of innovation implies an increasing of average 
cost of innovation, which partly, if not completely, depends on our definition ofn( )Sb t . 
Noting that our definition ofn( )Sb t is reasonable and acceptable in some sense. We 
argue that the current paper at least provides us with a “possibility”, and given the 
logic behind the possibility, the above story inevitably happens. 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL POLICY COOPERATION 
In this section, we study the issue of policy cooperation between the North and the 
South. Note that an agreement of IPR protection cannot be achieved unless the 
incentive-problem has been solved firstly. Our purpose is to search for conditions 
under which a degree of IPR protection is optimal with respect to the welfare for both 
the North and the South. And as is shown that the welfare functions of the North and 
the South are maximized simultaneously, we call the corresponding degree of IPR 
protection in the South globally efficient. 
As a matter of fact, we obtain, 
PROPOSITION 13. If S Nρ ρ= ,Θ satisfies (E.1)16and (0) (0)N SA A satisfies (E.4), 
then we get 1 2μ μ∗ ∗= . In particular, as (0) 1Sζ → , and if S Nρ ρ= ,Θ satisfies (E.1) and 
(0) (0)N SA A satisfies (E.5), then we get 1 2μ μ∗ ∗= . 
PROOF. See Appendix E. 
REMARK. It is 1μ∗ and 2μ∗ that are compared because they all depend on the same 
                                                        
16 See Appendix E. 
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condition (0)N Nζ ζ= by a view of Proposition 2 and Proposition 5(ii). 
Moreover, we get, 
PROPOSITION 14. If S Nρ ρ= , (0) (0)N SA A satisfies (F.3)17, then we get 1 4μ μ∗ ∗= . 
PROOF. See Appendix F. 
REMARK. It is 1μ∗ and 4μ∗ that are compared because they are conditional on the 
same assumption (0)N Nζ ζ= following from Proposition 2 and Proposition 5(iv). 
Moreover, we see, from the proofs of Proposition 13 and Proposition 14, that all the 
conditions are met as long as S Nρ ρ= and 0S NL L M >  for a given constant M . 
Actually, only S Nρ ρ= is a binding requirement in reality, which, however, can be 
indeed relaxed through a little adjustment of the ratio (0) (0)N SA A in view of the 
definitions of 1μ∗ , 2μ∗ and 4μ∗ . Therefore, we claim that: it follows from Proposition 13 
jointly with Proposition 14 that international policy cooperation, given the welfare of 
the North and the South is maximized simultaneously18, is possible in some relatively 
weak conditions. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, a variety expansion model has been constructed in the classical 
North-South framework. It is assumed that the South will invent new intermediates as 
well as the North. Imitation, however, only occurs in the South, and it consists of two 
types: efficient imitation (i.e., imitating Northern technology with certain given match 
level) and inefficient imitation (i.e., imitating other domestic innovators). Thus, 
needless to say, the Southern government, who will be in the position to choose 
certain kind of development strategy, faces the trade-off between imitating foreign 
technologies and encouraging domestic innovation. 
   For the North, it is shown that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
                                                        
17 See Appendix F. 
18 And just in this sense, we call the corresponding policy incentive-compatibility. 
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its welfare and the inverse measure of Southern IPR protection. Moreover, after 
taking the endogenous innovation growth rate into account, we have proved that there 
is a U-shaped relationship between Northern equilibrium growth rate and Southern 
IPR protection. 
   On the other hand, for the South, we prove that, given the specification of 
lump-sum taxation, an increasing of the subsidy rate to innovation will definitely 
improve the welfare. And we show, in different conditions, that there always exists a 
corresponding optimal degree of IPR protection, and also our model points out that 
there are complementary relationships between those optimal IPR protection policies 
and the innovation subsidy policy. Furthermore, conditional on the endogenous 
innovation growth rate, it is argued that there is a U-shaped relationship between 
equilibrium growth rate and the policy of IPR protection while the equilibrium growth 
rate is independent of the choice of subsidy policy. 
   Moreover, we show that under certain weak conditions, a degree of Southern IPR 
protection will be optimal with respect to the welfare for both the North and the South, 
thereby implying the existence of an optimal degree of Southern IPR protection which 
is globally efficient. 
   Finally, we summarize the economic implications of our exploration from the 
following two viewpoints: firstly, for those developing countries, like China, having 
been involved in international trade and global competition, the corresponding 
policy-makers naturally face the following problem: what are the best institutional 
arrangements for gaining access to the knowledge (or innovation) that already exists 
in developed countries and meanwhile encouraging domestic production and 
employment of new knowledge (or innovation)? Rather, the current paper has been 
encouraged to translate the above circumstances requiring trade-off into our model 
and further our discussion has partly, if not completely, solved the above problem. 
Furthermore, admittedly, our ultimate goal is rapid and sustainable economic growth 
with widely shared and improved economic welfare. On the one hand, as is 
commonly known, endogenous growth theory distinguishes itself from neoclassical 
growth theory by incorporating knowledge (Romer, 1986, 1990; Grossman and 
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Helpman, 1990), human capital (Lucas, 1988, 1993; Eicher, 1996), endogenous 
technological change (Romer, 1986, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Eicher, 
1996), endogenous innovation (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and R&D (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Segerstrom, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones, 1995; 
Stokey, 1995; Howitt, 1999, 2000; Segerstrom and Zolnierek, 1999) into its 
theoretical models, thereby leading to ongoing economic growth. Nonetheless, on the 
other hand, behind the theory of endogenous economic growth, there exist incentive 
structure problems: what encourage people to learn existing knowledge and even 
produce new knowledge? Why firms devote substantial resources to R&D activities? 
Here, we insist, in line with North (1971, 1994) and Acemoglu et al (2004), that 
efficient institutional arrangements would form efficient incentive structure of a 
society, and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the 
underlying determinants of economic performance. And as is shown by our paper, 
optimal IPR protection is just one crucial institutional variable of many optional 
institutional instruments in the background of global trade. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
A. Proof of Proposition 7. 
From (39), (41) and (45), we see that, 
2
2 2 2 52 2
2 2
5 5 5 2 2 5
0 0
( ) 4
2( ) ( ) 4
S N S N S N S S S N S
S S S S N S N S S
g g g g
g g
η η η η ρμ η ρ
η η η η η η ρ
∗
< >
− −∂ −= +∂ −	
 	

, 
And so, 
2
5
0S
μ
η
∗∂ <∂
2
2 2 5 2 5
0
( ) 4S N S N S S S N S Sg g gη η η ρ η η ρ
<
⇔ − > −	
 ,                  (A.1) 
which always holds true. Hence, applying (41) and 5 1 3 4(0) (1 )S
S S S S S
A
η η ζ η η τ≡ + − − , 
we obtain, 
52 2
5
0
S S
S
S
A A
ημ μ
τ η τ
∗ ∗ ∂∂ ∂= <∂ ∂ ∂ , 
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by (A.1). Moreover, notice by (41), (45) and (A.1) that, 
    52 2
5
0
S
S S Sg g
ημ μ
η
∗ ∗ ∂∂ ∂= >∂ ∂ ∂ , 
▐ 
 
B. Proof of Proposition 8. 
By (38) and (46), we get, 
2
1 1 1 63 1
2 2
6 6 6 1 1 6
0 0
( ) 4 4
2( ) 4 ( ) 4
S S S S S S S S S S S
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g g g g
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η η η η η η ρ
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, 
Noting that, 
3
6
0S
μ
η
∗∂ <∂
2
1 1 6 1 6
0
( ) 4 2S S S S S S S S S Sg g gη η η ρ η η ρ
<
⇔ − > −	
 ,                  (B.1) 
which always holds true. Therefore, by (41), (B.1) and the definition of 6
Sη , we get, 
3 3 6 3
4
6 6
0
S S
S
S
S S
A A
μ μ η μητ η τ η
∗ ∗ ∗∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
Furthermore, since, 
6 2 3 4(0) (1 )S
S S N S S
A
η η ζ η η τ≡ + − − , 
Then by (39), (40) and (49), we get, 
6 32 2
8(0) (0)
S SS S
N N Sη ηη ηζ ζ η∂ ∂∂= + = +∂ ∂ ∂Θ Θ Θ Θ , 
where, 
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
8 3 ( ) (0)[( ) ( ) ] 0
S S S SS S S S N S SL Aα α α αη η β α α− − −≡∂ ∂ = − >Θ ,      (B.2) 
Hence, by (39), (B.1) and (B.2), 
3 3 6 3
8
6 6
1 (0) 0
S
N S
S S
μ μ η μ ζ ηη η
∗ ∗ ∗∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤= = − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∂Θ Θ , 
▐ 
 
C. Proof of Proposition 9. 
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Noting by (38), (39) and (47) that, 
4 1 2 1 2
2
7 7 7
0 0
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S S S S S S S
S S S
g gμ η η ρ η η
η η η
∗
< >
∂ + − Δ − += +∂ Δ	
 	

, 
where 2 21 2 1 2 7( ) ( ) 4( )
S S S S S S S Sg gη η η η η ρΔ= + − + . Hence, 
4
1 2 1 2 7
7
0 ( ) 2( )S S S S S S S SS g g
μ η η η η η ρη
∗∂ < ⇔ + Δ<Δ+ +∂                  (C.1) 
1 2 7
0
( ) 2S S S S Sgη η η ρ
<
⇔ Δ> + −	
 , 
which always holds true. Thus, 
74 4
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S S
S
S
A A
ημ μ
τ η τ
∗ ∗ ∂∂ ∂= <∂ ∂ ∂ , 
by (41), (C.1) and noting the fact that 7 3 4 (1 )S
S S S
A
η η η τ≡ − − . 
▐ 
 
D. Proof of Proposition 12. 
Noting that if (0)N Nζ ζ≠ and (0)S Sζ ζ≠ , 
(0)(1 )(0) ( ) 0
SS
SS S
SA
S S S
AC gg
v
στ
μ μ
−∂ ∂=− >∂ ∂ , 
by the following fact, 
n( ) ( )
( ) ( 1)
SS S
S
N S S
b t gb
A t v
σ
σ= = + , 
in (41). And from (44) we see that, 
2
1 (0) 1
(0) ( )
SS S
C
S S S S S S
U C
C
γ
μ ρ μ ρ μ
∂∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ , 
Furthermore, noting that, if (0) , (0)N N S Sζ ζ ζ ζ= = , and Ng is given in (19), then, 
2 2
(0) 0
( ) ( )
N S N N
S N S S N S
g g
g g
ζ μ
μ μ μ μ
∂ ∂= − <∂ + ∂ + ,                        (D.1) 
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2 2
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∂ ∂= − <∂ + ∂ + ,                        (D.2) 
Moreover, if (0)N Nζ ζ= and Ng is exogenously given, thus, 
2
(0) 0
( )
N N
S N S
g
g
ζ
μ μ
∂ =− <∂ + ,                                     (D.3) 
Thus, if (0)N Nζ ζ= and (0)S Sζ ζ≠ , then by (39), (D.1) and (D.3), 
2
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SS N S
S SA
S S S S
AC gg
v
στζημ μ μ
−∂ ∂ ∂= − >∂ ∂ ∂ , 
If (0)N Nζ ζ≠ and (0)S Sζ ζ= , then by (38) and (D.2), 
1
(0)(1 )(0) (0) ( ) 0
SS
SS S S
S SA
S S S S
AC gg
v
στζημ μ μ
−∂ ∂ ∂= − >∂ ∂ ∂ , 
If (0)N Nζ ζ= and (0)S Sζ ζ= , then by (38), (39), (D.1), (D.2) and (D.3), 
1 2
(0)(1 )(0) (0) (0) 0
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S
S
SS S N S
S S A
S S S SS S
AC g
v g σ
τζ ζη ημ μ μ μ−
−∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
Then, the required assertion follows via combining with Proposition 10. 
▐ 
 
E. Proof of Proposition 13. 
First, a comparison of (18) and (45) shows that if, 
1 2
2 5
,
,
,
S N
N S
N S
ρ ρ
η η
η η
⎧⎪ =⎪⎪⎪ =⎨⎪⎪⎪ =⎪⎩
 
Then we get 1 2μ μ∗ ∗= . From (14) and (39), 1 2N Sη η= implies that, 
{ }1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
( ) [( ) ( ) ] [( ) ( ) ]
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− − −
= −Θ ,(E.1) 
which implies that 0 1< <Θ given S NL L . From (15), (38), (40) and (41), 
2 5
N Sη η= means, 
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N Sη η= implies that, 
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Substituting (E.3) into (E.2) yields, 
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In particular, as (0) 1Sζ → , (E.4) can be rewritten as, 
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F. Proof of Proposition 14. 
First, a comparison of (18) and (47) shows that if, 
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Then we get 1 4μ μ∗ ∗= . From (15), (40) and (41), 2 7N Sη η= implies that, 
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Moreover, from (14), (38) and (39), 1 1 2
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Inserting (F.2) into (F.1) produces, 
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▐ 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson, 2004. Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth. NBER Working Paper No. 10481. 
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt, 1992. A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction. Econometrica 
60, 323-351. 
Arrow, K. J., 1962. The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing. Review of Economic 
Studies 29, 155-173. 
Canzoneri, M. B., R. E. Cumby and B. T. Diba, 2005. The need for international policy 
coordination: what’s old, what’s new, what’s yet to come? Journal of International Economics 
66, 363– 384. 
Chen, Y. and T. Puttitanun 2005. Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing 
countries. Journal of Development Economics 78, 474- 493. 
Chin, J. and G. M. Grossman 1990. Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade, in R.W. 
  39
Jones and A.O. Krueger, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade, Cambridge MA: 
Basil Blackwell Publishers. 
Chu, A.C., G. Cozzi and S. Galli 2011. Innovating like China: a theory of stage-dependent 
intellectual property rights. MPRA Paper No. 30553. 
Davidson, C. and P. Segerstrom, 1998. R&D Subsidies and Economic Growth. RAND Journal of 
Economics 29, 548-577. 
Deardorff, A. V., 1992. Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection. Economica 59, 35-51. 
Devereux, M. B. and C. Engel, 2003. Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price 
Setting and Exchange-Rate Flexibility. Review of Economic Studies 70, 765-783. 
Eicher, T. S., 1996. Interaction Between Endogenous Human Capital and Technological Change. 
Review of Economic Studies 63, 127-144. 
Furukawa, Y. 2007. The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous growth: Is 
stronger always better? Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, 3644-3670. 
Glass, A.J., 1997. Product Cycles and Market Penetration. International Economic Review 38, 
865-891. 
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman, 1990. Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth. 
American Economic Review 80, 796-815. 
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman, 1991. Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth. Review of 
Economic Studies 58, 43-61. 
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman, 1994. Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 23-44. 
Grossman, G. M. and E. L.-C. Lai. 2004. International Protection of Intellectual Property. 
American Economic Review 94, 1635-1653. 
Görg, H. and E. Strobl, 2007. The Effect of R&D Subsidies on Private R&D. Economica 74, 
215–234. 
Gould, D. M. and W. C. Gruben, 1996. The role of intellectual property rights in economic growth. 
Journal of Development Economics 48, 323-350. 
Haaland, J.I. and H. J. Kind, 2008. R&D policies, trade and process innovation. Journal of 
International Economics 74, 170-187. 
Helpman, E. 1993. Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights. Econometrica 61, 
1247-1280. 
Horii, R. and T. Iwaisako 2007. Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights. Journal of Economics 90, 45-85. 
Howitt, P., 1999. Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R & D Inputs Growing. 
Journal of Political Economy 107, 715-730. 
Howitt, P., 2000. Endogenous Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences. American 
Economic Review 90, 829-846. 
Jones, C. I., 1995. R & D-Based Models of Economic Growth. Journal of Political Economy 103, 
759-784. 
Kehoe, P.J., 1989. Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable. 
Review of Economic Studies 56, 289-296. 
Kwan, Y.K. and E. L. -C. Lai 2003. Intellectual property rights protection and endogenous 
economic growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27, 853-873. 
Levin, R. C., 1978. Technical Change, Barriers to Entry, and Market Structure. Economica 45, 
  40
347-361. 
Lucas, R. E., Jr., 1988. On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 22, 3-42. 
Lucas, R. E., Jr., 1993. Making a Miracle. Econometrica 61, 251-272. 
Maggi, G., 1999. The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation. 
American Economic Review 89, 190-214. 
Muniagurria, M.E. and N. Singh, 1997. Foreign Technology, Spillovers, and R & D Policy. 
International Economic Review 38, 405-430. 
North, D. C., 1971. Institutional Change and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic History 31, 
118-125. 
North, D. C., 1994. Economic Performance Through Time. American Economic Review 84, 
359-368. 
Romer, P. M., 1986. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Political Economy 94, 
1002-1037. 
Romer, P. M., 1990. Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy 98, 
S71-S102. 
Segerstrom, P. S., 1991. Innovation, Imitation, and Economic Growth. Journal of Political 
Economy 99, 807-827. 
Segerstrom, P. S., 1998. Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects. American Economic Review 
88, 1290-1310. 
Segerstrom, P. S. and J. M. Zolnierek, 1999. The R&D Incentives of Industry Leaders. 
International Economic Review 40, 745-766. 
Schneider, P.H., 2005. International trade, economic growth and intellectual property rights: A 
panel data study of developed and developing countries. Journal of Development Economics 
78, 529-547. 
Scotchmer, S., 1991. Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, 29-41. 
Spence, M., 1984. Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance. Econometrica 52, 
101-122. 
Spencer, B.J. and J. A. Brander, 1983. International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy. Review 
of Economic Studies L, 707-722. 
Stein, J.C., 1997. Waves of Creative Destruction: Firm-Specific Learning-by-Doing and the 
Dynamics of Innovation. Review of Economic Studies 64, 265-288. 
Stokey, N. L., 1995. R&D and Economic Growth. Review of Economic Studies 62, 469-489. 
Young, A., 1993. Invention and Bounded Learning by Doing. Journal of Political Economy 101, 
443-472. 
